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Abstract
Background: Executive functioning has been evaluated in obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD). Cool and hot executive functioning discrimination provided a 
different way of conceptualising executive functions. Objectives: The aim of this study was to compare ambiguity and risky decision-making and cool executive 
functions in an OCD and a healthy control group. The relationship between decision-making and cool executive functioning was investigated. Methods: Sixty-two 
OCD patients and 48 healthy control participants were compared. Decision-making was measured using the Iowa Gambling Task. The cool executive functioning 
was assessed using the Stroop Test and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST). Results: The OCD group completed the WCST and the Stroop Test statistically 
significantly with a lower score than that of the control group. The OCD group had impaired response inhibition and set-shifting that indicate impaired cool 
executive functioning. In contrast to a lack of a statistically significant difference, the risky decision-making performance was worse in the OCD group than in 
the healthy control group and in the unmedicated OCD patients than in the medicated OCD patients. Discussion: The OCD patients had a poorer performance 
in risky decision-making and cool executive functioning. There was a link between risky decision-making performance and impaired cool executive functions.
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Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) is a debilitating common 
disorder that severely afflicts functionality. OCD is characterised by 
intrusive thoughts and compulsive behaviours. It has been removed 
from the anxiety disorders in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders Fifth Edition, and OCD and related disorders 
have been separated into a new category. OCD is the characteristic 
member of this group disorders.
The executive functions include planning, organisation, being 
able to behave flexibly, the ability to generate alternative responses 
according to changing conditions, decision-making and maintaining 
or being able to cease inappropriate or impulsive behaviour. It has 
been proposed that OCD was associated with broad impairment in 
executive functioning and these impairments were not associated with 
comorbid depression or general motor slowing1. It has been suggested 
that there are two distinct executive function systems2,3. A “cool” 
(cognitive) executive system is related to problem-solving abilities 
that require the organisation of working memory, planning and 
suppression or execution of a response. A “hot” (affective) executive 
system is related to processes that are connected with emotional cues, 
affect and motivation. The hot executive system involves emotional 
regulation and affective interference. The hot executive function 
impairment may cause affective biases on executive control. Hot 
and cool executive functioning discrimination underlies that cool 
executive functions include non-emotional cognitive processes 
whereas hot executive functions include emotional cognitive process. 
Response inhibition, working memory, set-shifting and planning are 
examples of cool executive functions. The meta-analysis regarding 
the cool executive functions in OCD support that OCD has been 
linked to impaired cool executive functioning4,5. 
Decision-making is a cognitive process that provides making 
appropriate selections for different situations. The Iowa Gambling 
Task (IGT) measures the decision-making ability. The IGT, developed 
by Bechara et al.6, assess decision-making ability. It imitates real life 
in terms of ambiguity, reward and punishment. The task measures 
preferences, which would be chosen in the long term, namely, a 
low reward-low loss or a high reward-high loss. Decision-making 
capacity was primarily evaluated in cases with prefrontal cortex (PFC) 
lesions. Although these cases had a normal intellectual capacity and 
displayed intact executive functioning, they could not learn from 
previous experiences and had difficulty evaluating pros and cons thus 
eventually repeating similar mistakes6,7. Decision-making studies 
have been carried out not only for PFC lesions but also for alcohol 
and substance addiction8 and pathological gambling9.
Decision-making which is evaluated with the IGT, is 
conceptualised as an integration of both “hot” (affective) and “cool” 
(cognitive) systems9. Two different decision-making processes 
have been defined, namely, ambiguity and risky decision-making10. 
Ambiguity decision making is an example of a hot executive function. 
The selections are made via the emotions, affect and motivation in 
ambiguity decision making. On the other hand, risky decision making 
is an example of a cool executive function. The selections are made 
through previous experiences in risky decision-making. Both risky 
decision-making and cool executive functions are associated with a 
rational process11.
Cool and hot executive function discrimination has been 
provided important implications. This study aimed to investigate 
the relationship between cool executive function and risky decision-
making in an OCD group. There has been no study in the literature 
that has investigated this relationship in OCD and has examined 
these domains in one OCD sample. The ambiguity and risky decision-
making were compared in the OCD group and a healthy control 
group. The relationship between the risky decision-making and the 
cool executive functions that were evaluated using the Stroop Test and 
the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task was investigated. In addition, it was 
investigated whether there was any decision-making performance 
difference between medicated and unmedicated OCD groups.
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Methods
Participants
The OCD group included 62 patients aged 18-65 years who were 
recruited for the study after meeting the Structured Clinical Interview 
for DSM-IV/Clinical Version (SCID-I)12 diagnostic criteria for OCD. 
In addition, SCID-I was administered to determine other lifetime 
psychiatric comorbidities. Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD) diagnosis was investigated using the Adult Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Rating Scale. The participants were asked about any 
presence of an organic mental disorder in a face-to-face interview. 
The patients who had psychotic disorder, affective disorder, anxiety 
disorder, somatoform disorder, eating disorder, ADHD and organic 
mental disorder and alcohol and substance use disorder except nicotine 
use disorder were excluded because of possible confounding effects. It 
was confirmed that there was no aforementioned psychiatric diagnosis 
other than OCD. Another exclusion criterion was a deficit in intellectual 
functioning. The patients and those in the control group had at least 
primary school education. Two cases were ruled out because of receiving 
high scores for ADHD according to the Adult Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Rating Scale. Three cases reported previous academic 
failure, and these cases were ruled out after an assessment of intelligence. 
The OCD-diagnosed patients were treated with the following 
medications: 22 patients with sertraline, 14 with fluoxetine, 6 with 
paroxetine, 3 with escitalopram, 3 with clomipramine and 2 with 
fluvoxamine. Twelve cases were taking more than one drug. The 
augmentation medication was administered with risperidone in 
five cases, aripiprazole in four cases, olanzapine in two cases and 
haloperidol in one case. Eleven cases were newly diagnosed and were 
not receiving any medications.
The control group consisted of 48 healthy subjects. The control 
group was selected by age and their education matched up to the 
hospital staff participants (secretary, cleaning and security staff and 
nurse). The control group was interviewed using the SCID-I, and 
it was confirmed that there was no lifetime and current psychiatric 
diagnosis except nicotine use disorder. The participants in the control 
group who were recently and previously diagnosed with a psychiatric 
disorder or had a family history of OCD were ruled out. The subjects’ 
ages were between 18 and 65 years. 
The search was carried out in the Outpatient Department of 
Psychiatry of Bursa Yuksek Ihtisas Training and Research Hospital 
between September 2014 and December 2015. All of the participants 
who were confirmed to take part in the study provided a written 
informed consent. The study was approved by the local ethics committee.
Procedures
Patients who were referred to the Bursa Yuksek Ihtisas Education and 
Research Hospital Psychiatry Outpatient Clinic and were diagnosed 
with OCD were selected and gave an informed consent. The OCD 
diagnosis was confirmed by an SCID-I interview conducted by a 
psychiatrist. The OCD-diagnosed patients were enrolled in the study 
if there was no comorbid psychiatric diagnosis. The severity of the 
symptoms was evaluated by the Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive 
Scale (YBOCS) in OCD group. YBOCS is a rating scale that assesses 
the severity of obsessions and compulsions over the previous week 
in patients with OCD. Executive function tests and intelligence scale 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Test (WAIS) were administered 
by a certified psychologist. WAIS was administered if there was a 
suspicion of an intellectual disability or alleged mental retardation. 
The intellectual disability was verified with WAIS. Healthy people were 
selected as the subjects of the control group, and it was confirmed that 
there was no psychiatric diagnosis by the SCID-I interview.
The Executive Function Tests
All of the participants completed the IGT, the Stroop Test and the 
WCST.
The IGT, developed by Bechara et al.6, measures decision-
making. It consists of four decks: two of them are advantageous and 
the other two of them are disadvantageous. The decision-making 
score is calculated by the difference between the advantageous 
and the disadvantageous selections. The gain and the loss are less 
in the advantageous decks, so they are more profitable than the 
disadvantageous decks in the long term. After making random 
selections, normal cases start to avoid the disadvantageous decks. 
The selections from the disadvantageous decks are not only related 
to gaining a large amount of money but also to losing as much, even 
much more than gaining. The IGT consists of 100 cards, which are 
split into five blocks of 20 cards. These five blocks correspond to four 
learning phases. The first 20 cards (0-20) represent pre-punishment 
(baseline), the second 20 cards (21-40) a pre-hunch, the third 20 
cards (41-60) a hunch and the fourth (61-80) and fifth (81-100) 
blocks show conceptual knowledge. After making a small random 
selection, normal cases start to avoid the disadvantageous decks.
The first 40 cards have been conceptualised as decision-making 
under ambiguity, and selections between 41 and 100 cards have been 
classified as decision-making under risk13,14. The original paper used 
real cards were used for the assessment.
The Stroop Test, developed by Stroop15, measures response 
inhibition by naming the colour of the ink used to print the word 
without the reading the actual word. The test has five stages and the 
fourth stage is a preparation for the fifth stage. The last stage includes 
cards written in different colour-meaned words. The time to complete 
while naming the colour of the word was measured in the last stage. 
The Stroop interference effect was measured in this last stage.
The WCST assesses cognitive flexibility and set-shifting abilities, 
which are evaluated by a number of trials, total errors, perseverative 
responses, perseverative errors, non-perseverative errors, completed 
categories and a failure to maintain the set16. The WCST consists of 
128 cards version was utilized. The original paper used real cards 
were used both for the Stroop and the WCST assessment. 
Statistical analysis
Statistical analyses were carried out using SPSS version 21.0 for 
Windows. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test was used to check the 
normal distribution while the Chi-square Test for categorical 
variables. Numeric variables were compared based on their 
distribution patterns with the Mann-Whitney-U or the student 
t-test. The IGT consists of 100 cards that are divided into five groups 
with 20 cards in each group. The number of cards selected from the 
advantageous C and D decks was subtracted from the number of 
selected cards from the disadvantageous A and B decks. A Two-way 
Repeated Measures Variance Analysis was used to compare the IGT 
scores of the five decks among the groups and to compare ambiguity 
and risky decision-making. Greenhouse-Geisser Correction was used 
when the sphericity assumption was violated. Decision-making under 
ambiguity was evaluated by the first 40 cards, and decision-making 
under risk was measured by the cards between 41 and 100. The 
correlation between the IGT, the neuropsychological test scores, and 
the YBOCS score was evaluated by the Spearman correlation analysis. 
A p value of less than 0.05 was considered to show a statistically 
significant result.
Results
Sociodemographic and clinical characteristics 
The demographic characteristics of the study are shown in Table 1. 
Sixty-two OCD patients and 48 healthy control participants were 
enrolled in the study. The OCD and the control groups did not differ 
according to gender (p = 0.946), age (p = 0.530), education year 
(p = 0.291), and marital status (p = 0.095). The severity of OCD 
was evaluated with the YBOCS in the patient group (20.91 ± 8.37). 
The rate of a family history of OCD in the OCD-diagnosed cases 
was 41.9%. 
114 Güngör B et al. / Arch Clin Psychiatry. 2018;45(5):112-8
The results of the executive function tests are shown in Table 2. 
The comparisons revealed that the OCD group showed a significantly 
poorer response inhibition on the Stroop Test than the control group. 
In addition, the OCD group exhibited a poorer performance on the 
WCST. The OCD group executed a greater number of trials, total 
errors, perseverative responses, non-perseverative errors, a failure to 
maintain the set and a lower number of completed categories and 
conceptual responses. 
Decision making evaluation
The comparison of the IGT performance change from the first to the 
last block which represents four learning phases, is shown in Figure 1 
for the OCD group and the healthy control group and in Figure 2 
for the medicated and the unmedicated OCD groups. No statistically 
significant differences were found between the OCD group and the 
control group from the first to the fifth block of the IGT (F = 1.530, 
p = 0.193). The IGT scores seemed to be higher initially in the 
ambiguity decision-making in the OCD group compared with the 
healthy group, but there was no statistically significant difference. 
The first block represents a baseline assessment and is associated 
with casual decisions17. Although there was no statistically significant 
difference, the initial IGT score was higher, but the final IGT score 
was lower in the OCD group than in the healthy control group 
(Figure 1). There was no statistically significant difference between 
the medicated and the unmedicated OCD groups for the IGT 
performance (F = 0.121, p = 0.955; Figure 2).
The comparison of ambiguity and risky decision-making is 
presented in Figure 3 between the OCD group and the healthy 
control group and in Figure 4 for the medicated and the unmedicated 
OCD groups. No statistically significant differences were found on 
the ambiguity and the risky decision-making performance between 
the OCD group and the healthy control group (F = 1.811, p = 0.18). 
Although there was no statistically significant difference, the mean 
of the ambiguity decision-making score was higher, while the mean 
of the risky decision-making score was lower in the OCD group 
compared with the healthy control group (Figure 3). There was no 
statistically significant difference between the medicated and the 
unmedicated OCD groups for ambiguity and risky decision making 
(F = 0.014, p = 0.908). Although not statistically significant, the mean 
of the risky decision-making score in the unmedicated OCD group 
was lower than in the medicated OCD group (Figure 4). 
The correlation between clinical features, decision making 
and executive function in the OCD group
Spearman correlation analysis was performed between clinical 
features, decision-making and executive functions in the OCD 
group. Table 3 shows the results of the correlation analysis. There 
was a positive correlation between the IGT last block performance 
and the Stroop Test performance. Except for these findings, no 
significant association was determined between the IGT performance 
and other parameters.
Table 1. Demographic and clinical characteristics of OCD patients and healthy control group 
OCD (N = 62) Healthy Control (N = 48) Chi square/Z/t P = Chi square/Mann 
Whitney-U/t test
Gender 
Female/male 43(%69.4)/19(%30.6) 33(%68.7)/15(%31.3) 0.005 0.946*
Age 34.15 ± 10.32 32.27 ± 7.48 2.967 0.272***
Education year 10.69 ± 4.38 10.29 ± 3.14 -1.057 0.291**
Marital status
Married/single-divorced 35(%56.4)/27(%43.6) 35(%72.9)/13(%27.1) 4.709 0.095*
YBOCS
Family history of OCD Yes/No
20.91 ± 8.37
26(%41.9)/36(58.1)
* Chi square. ** Mann Whitney U. *** t test.
Table 2. Comparison of neuropsychological assessment of the groups
OCD (N = 62) Healthy control (N = 48) Z/t p = Mann Whitney-U/t test 
Stroop 28.85 ± 8.41 22.77 ± 4.98 4.865 0.000**
WCST Number of trials 120.41 ± 17.22 110.93 ± 18.40 -3.306 0.001*
Total errors 50.01 ± 18.54 35.15 ± 17.83 -3.601 0.000*
Completed categories 3.62 ± 1.71 5.03 ± 1.35 3.818 0.000*
Perseverative responses 31.37 ± 15.89 20.71 ± 11.47 0.921 0.001**
Non-perseverative errors 27.37 ± 12.68 15.18 ± 8.63 3.456 0.001**
Perseverative errors 22.72 ± 11.35 18.50 ± 9.54 1.178 0.001**
Failure to maintain set 1.08 ± 1.21 0.93 ± 1.21 -0.672 0.502*
* Mann Whitney U. ** t test.
Figure 1. Comparison of IGT performance change from the first to the last 
block between OCD and healthy control group.
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There was a positive correlation between OCD severity that was 
evaluated with the YBOCS and the Stroop Test scores. The higher 
OCD severity was correlated with higher Stroop Test scores and an 
impaired response inhibition. 
Discussion
Determining decision-making and executive function in an OCD 
group and a healthy control group demonstrated that the OCD group 
had impaired response inhibition, cognitive flexibility and set-shifting 
abilities compared with the healthy control group. Although there 
was no statistically significant difference between the OCD group 
and the healthy control group for decision making performance, the 
mean score of the IGT tended to decrease from the beginning to the 
end point of the task and from the ambiguity decision-making phase 
to the risky decision-making phase in the OCD group. The healthy 
control group showed improvement in decision making performance 
from ambiguity to risky decision-making over time but OCD group 
performed worse over time and at risky decision-making in the IGT 
(Figures 1 and 2).
OCD has been considered to be responsible for a broad range of 
executive function deterioration. Inhibitory control has been found 
to be impaired in OCD18, which could be linked to an inability to 
inhibit repetitive thoughts and behaviours. Existing literature denote 
that set-shifting and response inhibition, which are components of 
the executive function and performed by the WCST and the Stroop 
Test, respectively, have been impaired in OCD19. Response inhibition 
has been proposed as an endophenotype of OCD18. Abramovitch 
reported that a medium weighted mean effect size was found for 
response inhibition in the metaanalysis of 23 studies4. Consistent 
with previous studies19-23, we detected that the OCD group completed 
the WCST and the Stroop Test poorer than the control group. The 
OCD group was significantly impaired on set-shifting, which was 
measured with the WCST. The OCD group responded perseveratively 
to the previously rewarded stimulus. The OCD-diagnosed group 
showed a significantly poorer response inhibition on the Stroop 
Test than the control one; they needed more time to complete the 
test. In other words, the OCD group required a greater effort for a 
response inhibition. 
The studies in the literature related to decision-making in OCD 
have accumulated in recent years. Lawrence and Nielen found no 
difference between the OCD group and the healthy control group 
for decision-making performance21,24. However, the studies that have 
evaluated decision-making in OCD presented controversial results. 
The studies suggested that OCD originated from25 and is related 
to impaired decision-making26. Some of the studies that ascertain 
Figure 4. Comparison of ambiguity and risky decision making between 
medicated and unmedicated OCD groups.
Figure 2. Comparison of IGT performance change from the first to the last 
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Figure 3. Comparison of ambiguity and risky decision making between OCD 
and healthy control groups.
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There was a positive correlation between the Stroop Test 
performance and the WCST performance (total errors, perseverative 
response and perseverative errors). A poor Stroop Test performance 
was correlated with a poor WCST performance. 
Table 3. Relationship between decision making, WCST and Stroop in OCD 
group
YBOCS Stroop Total 
errors
Completed 
categories
Perseverative 
responses
Stroop 0.323
p < 0.05
Total errors - 0.273
p < 0.05
Completed 
categories
- - -0.773
p < 0.01
Perseverative 
responses
- 0.272
p < 0.05
0.775
p < 0.01
-0.578
p < 0.01
Non-
perseverative 
errors
- - 0.644
p < 0.01
-0.588
p < 0.01
-
Perseverative 
errors
- 0.307
p < 0.05
0.772
p < 0.01
-0.627
p < 0.01
0.989
p < 0.01
IGT (81-100)
(last block)
- -0.441
p = 0.01
- - -
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decision-making in OCD determined that the OCD group performed 
significantly poorer on the IGT than the control group26-28. Previous 
studies that used IGT evaluated the task as a whole and did not 
discriminate IGT as an ambiguity and a risky phase and if there was a 
difference between the OCD and control groups, it was interpreted as 
a difference at the ambiguity decision making29. However, according 
to a new paradigm, IGT has been conceptualised as an integration of 
both ambiguity and risky decision-making processes.
The studies that assessed decision-making under ambiguity and 
risk have been using two different methods. One of the methods uses 
only the IGT. The decision making under ambiguity is measured 
via the first blocks of the IGT and decision-making under risk via 
the last blocks9,13,14. The other method uses the IGT for evaluating 
decision-making under ambiguity and the Game of Dice Task (GDT) 
for decision-making under risk3,10,30. It was observed that the IGT 
last block performance and the GDT performance was correlated10. 
According to the first method which was used in our study, the first 
blocks of the IGT refer to decision-making under ambiguity. The 
probabilities of reward and loss are unknown when selections are 
made in the first blocks. The last blocks refer to decision-making 
under risk. The probabilities of reward and loss are known in the last 
blocks10. Decision-making under ambiguity is an example of a hot 
executive function; the selections are made via the emotions, affect 
and motivation. While decision-making under risk is an example 
of a cool executive function, the selections are made via previous 
experiences. The cool executive function has been associated with a 
rational process and has been related to the knowledge of the risk/
benefit ratio11. The IGT has been conceptualised as an integration of 
both “hot” (affective) and “cool” (cognitive) systems. The former part 
of the IGT, the first blocks, are related to hot executive functions, and 
the latter part of the IGT, the last blocks, are related to cool executive 
functions. Brand reported that impaired cool executive functioning 
with intact hot executive functioning was associated with a better 
performance in decision-making under ambiguity than decision-
making under risk31. However, impaired hot executive functioning 
with intact cool executive functioning was associated with both 
a lowered performance of decision-making under ambiguity and 
risk32,33. The relationship between hot and cool executive functions 
has been conceptualised in a pattern. It has been suggested that 
emotional reactions should be regulated primarily, and after that, 
problem-solving abilities and cognitive processes can be enacted34. 
In our study, the comparison of the OCD group and the healthy 
control group did not show a statistically significant difference 
according to the decision-making performance from the beginning 
to the end of the fifth phase of the task. Although there was no 
statistically significant difference, the mean of the IGT score at 
the initial phase was higher, but the mean of the IGT score at the 
last phase was lower in the OCD group than in the healthy control 
group. The mean of the ambiguity decision-making scores was 
higher, but the mean of the risky decision-making scores was lower 
in the OCD group compared with the healthy control group. In 
summary, the mean scores of the IGT in the OCD group tended to 
decrease from the ambiguity decision-making process to the risky 
one. Although not statistically significant, the mean of the IGT score 
was higher in the ambiguity decision-making phase but lower in the 
risky decision-making phase in the OCD group than in the healthy 
control group. It was considered that a small sample size could 
prevent detection differences between the groups. A study with a 
larger sample size may improve the study power and help identify 
the differences. The measurement of decision-making in the healthy 
control group showed an unexpected result and was different from 
Bechara’s control group6. The healthy control group had gradually 
shifted their preferences towards the advantageous decks as the task 
progressed in Bechara’s study. However, the healthy control group 
continued to select disadvantageous decks at the beginning of the 
conceptual phase in this study. The absence of a nonsignificant 
difference between the OCD and the healthy control groups may 
be due to a poor performance of the control group. In line with 
our results, Grassi reported that there was no significant difference 
between the OCD patients and the controls in the single blocks of 
IGT or in the performance of ambiguity and risky decision-making. 
Furthermore, similar with our results, Grassi reported that the IGT 
performance improved over time from the first block to the last 
block of IGT in the control group, while patients’ performance did 
not improve. This result was considered as an indicator for impaired 
risky decision-making for OCD35. Additionally, Kodaira found the 
same results in a child sample, the OCD-diagnosed group selected 
disadvantageous cards towards the end of the IGT task. Although 
these studies underlie the impaired trend over time in IGT, they did 
not associate the results with ambiguity and risky decision-making 
and did not investigate the relationship between decision-making 
and executive functioning from this perspective36. Contradictory to 
our findings, Starcke3 and Zhang30 reported that the OCD patients 
demonstrated a poorer performance on decision-making under 
ambiguity than the control subjects, while the decision-making under 
risk performance was similar.
In addition to previous findings, there was no statistically 
significant difference between the medicated and the unmedicated 
OCD groups for a complete IGT task comparison (Figure 2) and for 
an ambiguity and risky decision-making performance comparison 
(Figure 4). Although not statistically significant, the mean of the 
risky decision-making score in the unmedicated OCD patients 
was lower than in the medicated OCD ones. Contradictory to our 
results, Kuelz reported that medicated OCD patients had a poorer 
executive function test performance compared with unmedicated 
OCD ones. However, this finding in that study was interpreted as an 
effect of confounding variables, such as comorbidity or psychotropic 
medication37. On the other hand, Cavedini investigated the decision-
making function on the treatment response. It has been proposed 
that a poor decision-making performance is correlated with a poor 
response to treatment27. Zhang recently reported that the refractory 
OCD patients presented significant improvements in the IGT 
performance after anterior capsulotomy38.
There was a positive correlation between the IGT last block 
performance and the Stroop Test performance, of which there were 
reported examples of cool executive functions in the OCD group11. 
In line with our results, Noel claimed that there was a relationship 
between cool executive function and the last part of decision-making. 
Therefore, it was suggested that the IGT last block performance might 
be involved in cool executive functions13. Inhibitory control could 
be more important during the last blocks of the task because the 
participant was aware of the risk of each deck after the former part 
of the IGT. The performance of the latter stages of the IGT has been 
associated with the performance of response inhibition13. Norman 
reported that patients with OCD showed activation deficits during a 
decision-making task in the fronto-striato-insular-cerebellar regions 
responsible for inhibitory control. The OCD group had increased 
choice impulsivity in that study39. However, Goudrian and van 
Holst reported that there was no association between impairments 
in cool executive functions and decision making in pathological 
gambling40,41. The review concerning the relationship between 
decision-making and cognitive abilities including inhibition, a 
working memory, set-shifting and verbal and nonverbal IQ revealed 
that there was no relationship between them and suggested that these 
findings highlighted the separability between decision-making and 
cognitive abilities. However, this review evaluated both clinical and 
nonclinical samples42. Except for the significant correlation between 
response inhibition measured with the Stroop Test and the IGT 
last block performance, no significant association was determined 
between the former part of the IGT and the response inhibition and 
set-shifting function in our study.
There was a positive correlation between the YBOCS score and the 
Stroop Test score. High Stroop Test scores show an impaired response 
inhibition. High YBOCS scores have been associated with an impaired 
Stroop Test performance in this study. Our result is consistent with 
the study of Peles, which declared that a Stroop Test interference was 
correlated significantly with the OCD severity score43. Contradictory 
to this finding, Nielen reported that cognitive impairments could be 
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a trait feature because they detected that cognitive symptoms were 
not secondary to symptoms22. There was no correlation between 
the decision-making and YBOCS score in our study. Aranovich 
reported that decision-making under risk correlated with OCD 
symptomology44. Nielen et al. determined that IGT performance and 
OCD severity were positively correlated with each other24.
The study has several limitations. One of them is that, the 
assessment of decision-making under risk could be made with the 
GDT at the same time. The assessment of intelligence was performed 
to provide exclusion of intellectual disability if only there was a 
suspicion. If we had evaluated intellectual capacity in the whole 
sample, this could have provided a comparison between intellectual 
performance and the other executive function tests. A small sample 
size could be an effect that could limit the statistical significance for 
decision-making comparison between the groups. 
In conclusion, we found evidence that the OCD group have 
impaired cool executive functioning and altered and impaired risky 
decision-making than the healthy control groups. The OCD group 
exhibited a poorer performance on the WCST and the Stroop Test, 
which are examples of cool executive function. There was a positive 
correlation between another example of a cool executive function, 
namely, the IGT last block performance and the Stroop Test 
performance. Although not statistically significant, the IGT scores 
were lower in the risky decision-making phases in OCD. It has been 
considered that OCD may have an accompanying cool executive 
function impairment. An impairment in risky decision-making may 
be a part of an impaired cool executive functioning in this context. 
In this study, ambiguity decision-making seems to be intact in OCD. 
Vandenbroucke suggested that the decision-making process 
might be an endophenotype that could have important implications 
for OCD treatment45. Additional studies are needed to confirm these 
results in a large sample. Further studies that evaluate ambiguity and 
risky decision-making processes in OCD and the unaffected relatives 
of OCD patients would highlight, whether risky decision-making 
could be an endophenotype candidate or an epiphenomenon in OCD.
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